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ABSTRACT: 
 
In this paper, I seek to prepare the way for a comparative analysis of dynastic 
centres in Europe and Asia. This is a timely challenge, following trends in European 
historiography stressing the persistence of household structures and ritual at the 
heart of the early modern state, as well as recent detailed studies of Asian courts. 
Clearly patterns varied greatly, but the divergences should not be fitted 
unthinkingly into a grand narrative based on the ‘rise of the west’. Among the issues 
equally relevant for courts in Europe and Asia, I privilege two. In the first place, all 
rulers needed loyal agents, yet could not easily guarantee their loyalty over time. 
Agents in the long run tend to become vested interest groups, standing in the way of 
the ruler’s personal power. The court was a main theatre where this tension could 
be solved or exacerbated. In the second place the dynastic centre with its 
redistributive function and its calendar of rituals could offer a point of orientation 
for regional elites not otherwise connected, hence bringing cohesion to loosely 
governed multi-ethnic empires or composite monarchies. After considering 
comparative strategies and problems related to scope, as well as obstacles created 
by languages and sources, I elaborate in some detail four foci for research:  
 
1) the ruler himself (or more rarely herself);  
2) the dynasty, succession, reproduction (evidently including women as 
well as siblings);  
3) the status, composition, and tasks of the groups serving the ruler; and 
finally  
4) the connections of this grouping with its wider social environment.  
                                                 
1
 The author thanks Subrata K. Mitra, the anonymous reader of this journal and the staff at 
Heidelberg University‘s South Asia Institute (Department of Political Science) for criticism 
and suggestions. This paper reflects plans for a cooperative project, and explicitly invites 
readers‘ comments. In spring 2008 a first version of this research plan was submitted to the 
European Research Council‘s advanced investigator grant programme; it passed the 
‗quality threshold‘, but was not funded. I aim to resubmit an improved version of the 
project described in this paper in spring 2010. Please note that references to literature and 
sources have been kept to a minimum, privileging recent work directly related to my 
themes over standard texts.   
2
 The Author is Professor of Early Modern History at University of Groningen. He can be 
contacted at Jeroen.Duindam@rug.nl.  
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It is my contention that in each of these four subsequent concentric circles we can 
define a series of questions relevant for all dynastic centres, notwithstanding huge 
cultural differences separating civilizations, regions, and periods. Using diachronic 
and synchronic approaches to study a focused theme, I hope to reach a level of 
comparative precision that goes beyond open generalized statements while 
retaining analytical precision and proximity to sources. This can only be structured 
as a joint effort, the outlines of which are suggested here.  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Most comparative research on early modern Europe and Asia has been organized 
implicitly or explicitly around the notion of a ‗rise of the West‘. Students of the 
comparative history of state-building have contrasted ineffective and despotic 
empires in Asia with smaller-scale effective states in Europe, stressing the 
competitive multipolar environment and the role of corps intermédiaires in 
European politics. While the interesting yet Manichean views of Wittfogel and 
other classics have now been surpassed by more nuanced interpretations, the 
perspective of a ‗rise of the West‘ itself entails an unnecessary narrowing of our 
horizon of research questions. Its endpoint inevitably is the economic and military 
dominance of Europe, established over even the most powerful Asian empires in 
the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Where did Asian empires 
skid off course? When, where, and how did Europe achieve its edge of superiority? 
Interpretations stressing military innovation, political competition leading to 
increasingly effective extraction of resources, private initiative and economic 
competitiveness, and scientific breakthrough vie for precedence. 
 
While such questions are undoubtedly important, they tend to privilege 
modernity and breakthrough in early modern European history while seeking out 
signs of decadence or structural limitation in Asia as well as in pre-modern Europe. 
The modernization perspective has long since led scholars to stress the modernity 
of the early modern European state: they focused on bureaucracies, ministers, and 
representative assemblies, seriously underestimating the persistent dominance of 
the household in the heart of the dynastic state. A ‗new court history‘ emerging 
over the last two decades has provided numerous studies underlining the role of the 
household in the political make up of dynastic states, at the same time stressing the 
political relevance of rituals. Several early modern Asian polities, moreover, had 
developed machineries of bureaucratic checks and balances far exceeding 
contemporary practice in European dynastic states. Clearly, it no longer suffices to 
qualify European early modern monarchies as efficient machineries of decision 
making and resource extraction, while sidelining contemporary dynastic states in 
Asia as inadequate ‗palace polities‘. More importantly, as soon as we leave aside 
the axioms of the traditional modernization perspective, a convergence in themes 
and interpretations emerges around household and dynastic government that 
positively invites comparative work.
3
 In this paper, I accept this challenge by 
                                                 
3
 See several recent comparative efforts: A.J.S. SPAWFORTH, The Court and Court 
Society in Ancient Monarchies (Cambridge 2007); Anne WALTHALL, ed., Servants of the 
Dynasty. Palace Women in World History (Berkeley, Los Angeles 2008); Tülay ARTAN, 
Jeroen DUINDAM, Metin KUNT, ed., Royal Courts in Dynastic States and Empires 
(forthcoming Brill).  
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identifying structures and patterns recurring in the context of pre-modern dynastic 
household-based rule, rephrasing them in a reasoned layout for thematic 
comparison. In a preliminary section, I will address some of the problems and 
choices related to my comparison of dynastic centres. 
 
Patterns of kinship and settlement have varied widely in human history. 
Alongside other variants of communal living, the household based on a nuclear or 
extended family has been a widespread form of organizing daily life and 
reproduction. In hierarchical societies, the household of a leader tends to serve as a 
conspicuous centre of the wider social unit, a household writ large underpinning 
the supremacy of the leader‘s clan as well as symbolizing the cohesion of the group 
as a whole. Arguably, the enhanced household around the ruler represents the form 
of power predominant in global history. We can produce archeological and written 
materials as well as artistic representations ad libitum to support this statement. 
Style, form and scale, however, will differ immensely, from modest and accessible 
dwellings barely distinguishable from their environment to imposing and secluded 
palatial complexes.  
 
Household servants cater for the daily needs of rulers, administer their 
domains, and typically also perform services we would qualify as pertaining to the 
government of the realm. Services for person, household, domain, and government 
overlap. Terms such as oikos, domus, Haus or maison are used not only for the 
house and its dwellers, but can also refer to the lineage, to its domains, and even to 
the economy of the ‗state‘. Early modern Europeans typically used the word state 
when referring to the listing of people present at court (Hofstaat) or to budgets, 
rather than to the abstract concept of the state. An increasing separation between 
household and government, conceptually as well as in terms of personnel, 
developed gradually. Throughout history, the two usually seem to have been 
closely intertwined – although the differentiated structures of court and 
administration in Chinese history and the atypical development of the Roman 
imperial household alongside Republican political institutions show that this is not 
a general rule. In using the term court, I refer to the amalgam of household and 
government services grouped around the person of a dynastic ruler. The question 
whether or not these services were separated can only be answered by examining 
both elements and their connections. I use the term dynastic centre because it 
widens the horizon, explicitly situating the court in its political, social and cultural 
environment; moreover, it puts at a distance specifically European literary and 
artistic overtones of the terms court and courtier. 
 
As soon as rulers and leading lineages emerge certain questions will arise 
regarding 1) the ruler himself (or more rarely herself); 2) the dynasty and its 
continuation (evidently including women as well as siblings); 3) the status, 
composition, and tasks of the groups serving the ruler; and finally 4) the 
connections of this grouping with its wider social environment. It is my contention 
that in each of these four subsequent concentric circles of ruler-dynasty-palace 
staffs-connections, we can define a series of questions relevant for all dynastic 
centres, notwithstanding huge cultural differences separating civilizations, regions, 
and periods.  
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These four dimensions, elaborated in the second part of this paper, are further 
streamlined by two perspectives of general importance for the history of power 
structures and state-building. The first concerns the necessity of delegating power, 
a process in which over time almost inevitably loyal agents are turned into vested 
interest groups. This dilemma resounds in dynastic as well as modern political 
history. Particularly strong rulers can thwart elites undermining dynastic power; yet 
all rulers need to create a trusted group of agents or institutions supporting them 
and implementing their measures. It seems inevitable that such groups in the longer 
run resurface as power elites: the story starts all over again. A set of precepts and 
practices developed to prevent or resolve this situation, which is reflected in the 
organizational make-up as well as in the written legacies of dynastic centres.
4
 My 
second general perspective relates to the potential of the dynastic centre to integrate 
elites from diverse backgrounds by creating a conspicuous ritual centre, which 
organized redistribution of resources and served as a model for high culture. 
Dynastic power in the pre-modern world remained limited in practice, even if it 
was usually elevated to great heights in ritual and representation. While dynastic 
power often arose in conquest, violence or the threat of violence were never 
sufficient to hold together a realm in the long run. The household could admirably 
organize two other essential prerequisites of socio-political harmony. It appealed to 
material interests through its redistributive functions; it strengthened cohesion by 
involving variable audiences in its public rituals, conspicuous hierarchies, and high 
culture. Elites and the populace at large could be ‗persuaded to acquiesce‘ by these 
activities of the dynastic centre.
5
 The ambivalent moral reputation of the dynastic 
centre – a model of sophistication easily turned into its negative counter-image 
associated with lust, luxury, ambition and vanity – indicates that identification 
could easily be reverted, when either physical circumstances or the attitudes of the 
ruler and his following alienated the populace. ‗Regime changes‘ replacing 
declining dynasties with vigorous young dynasties are a standard element in 
traditional models of dynastic power from the Chinese dynastic cycle to Ibn 
Khaldun‘s Muqaddimah.6  
 
 
STRATEGIES OF COMPARATIVE RESEARCH 
 
Comparative and intercultural research can follow many models. Dynastic centres 
organized around a household serving the ruler can be found in many periods and 
                                                 
4
 The impressive study of ‗state breakdown‘ by Jack GOLDSTONE, Revolution and 
Rebellion in the Early Modern World (Berkeley 1991) stresses demography as single or 
dominant factor; the recurring pattern of  ruler-elite dynamics sketched here is certainly an 
additional (as Goldstone would probably concede), and in my perspective also an 
independent factor. s 
5
 David CANNADINE, ‗Introduction‘ in: Rituals of Royalty. Power and Ceremonial in 
Traditional Societies (Cambridge 1987) pp. 1-19, p. 19: ―Yet for any society, in any age, 
the study of politics ultimately comes down to one elemental question: how are people 
persuaded to acquiesce in a polity where the distribution of power is manifestly unequal 
and unjust, as it invariably is.‖ 
6
 Ibn KHALDUN, The Muqaddimah. An Introduction to History, Franz ROSENTHAL, ed. 
(Princeton 1967), notably many passages on tribal ‗group feeling‘(Asabiyya) undermined 
by sedentary life and luxury. 
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regions, diachronic as well as synchronic research strategies can be followed. 
Diachronic comparison in one region makes possible the analysis of continuity and 
change over time, whereas synchronic comparison in several regions allows the 
study of interaction among dynastic centres in a single epoch. The Heidelberg 
cluster of excellence focuses on shifting asymmetries in cultural flows between 
Asia and Europe, and hence would seem to privilege a synchronic perspective. My 
previous study of dynastic centres left me with the impression that combined 
diachronic and synchronic perspectives can be the most effective strategy to tackle 
several thorny questions.
7
  
 
One such question certainly is the classical opposition between ‗diffusionism‘ 
and the notion of independent development in physically separated areas. 
Traditions of rulership can be traced in terms of artefacts and palace decoration as 
well as in household structures. Thus, for instance, until the end of the Holy Roman 
Empire in 1806, emperors-elect were ceremonially crowned and dressed with 
attributes thought to have originated in Carolingian times. Napoleon still vainly 
tried to appropriate this crown with its age-old imperial connotations. The relics 
connected to the prophet and the caliphs likewise were captured by a series of 
dynasties before they reached Topkapi palace. At a different level, we can establish 
some continuity in court offices and structures, connecting the Carolingian and 
Ottonian courts to later European courts.
8
 A tentative line of development and 
imitation has been construed from the Abbasids to Mamluk, Ottoman and Safavid 
practices combining palace-based slave-soldiers, eunuchs and slave-concubines.
9
 
Staffs of the court (chamber, table, stables, hunt, guards, etc) as well as specific 
offices (e.g. cupbearer, chamberlain, falconer) seem similar in many ages and 
places. Hardly everything can be explained by contact, imitation, and tradition, 
however. Staffs follow the logic of everyday household life, also reflected in some 
of the recurring offices. Differentiated rules for access show striking similarity 
from one court to another, yet they too are an inevitable component of household 
practices in any hierarchical environment, and shouldn‘t necessarily be interpreted 
as an importation from a specific origin. Forms of extreme deference, notably by 
touching the ground with the forehead as practiced in proskynesis or kow-tow, 
finally, can be found in many cultures; again, the pattern seems general to the point 
of sociobiological cliché, and only far more specific characteristics can indicate 
actual imitation. 
 
Undoubtedly long-standing traditions exist in court life, offering a repository 
of practices and images for later generations, yet we need to differentiate between 
                                                 
7
 Jeroen DUINDAM, Myths of Power. Norbert Elias and the early modern European Court 
(Amsterdam 1995); DUINDAM, Vienna and Versailles. The Courts of Europe’s Dynastic 
Rivals, 1550-1780 (Cambridge 2003).  
8
 On the Kleinodien see Hermann FILLITZ, Die Insignien und Kleinodien des heiligen 
Römischen Reiches (Vienna, Munich 1954); on Carolingian court offices and their impact 
on later medieval courts see Werner RÖSENER, ‗Hofämter an mittelalterlichen 
Fürstenhöfen‘, Deutsches Archiv für Erforschung des Mittelalters, 45 (1989) pp. 485-550. 
9
 Patricia CRONE, Slaves on Horses: the Evolution of the Islamic Polity (Cambridge 1980); 
David AYALON, Eunuchs, Caliphs and Sultans: A Study in Power Relationships 
(Jerusalem 1999); recently also S. BABAIE, K. BABAYAN, e.a. Slaves of the Shah. New 
elites of Safavid Iran (London, New York 2004).  
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the various ways in which these traditions could operate. What was the relevance 
of, say, the Persian tradition of kingship, from the Achaemenids to Nadir Shah? 
This multifaceted and malleable influence blended with Arabic, Islamicate, and 
Turkic forms, each adding its own repertory of ideas and practices.
10
 In learning, 
poetry and architecture, as well as in the pragmatic science of ruling and 
administration, the Persian tradition had a lasting influence, but rulers permanently 
reinvented and reformed it, even when they sought to re-establish the tradition. The 
reputation of ‗Burgundian-Spanish ceremonial‘ in Europe shows how a tradition 
could be taken extremely seriously, whereas at the same time its substance 
remained wholly unclear. Generations after the end of the actual Burgundian court, 
Charles V reinstated what he thought were its practices in Spain. Soon, the 
Habsburgs in Spain as well as in Austria prided themselves on their ‗Burgundian‘ 
legacy. In Vienna, courtiers referred to the Burgundian tradition when they needed 
a powerful rhetoric argument in favour of challenged age-old rights; ‗Burgundian‘ 
represented the acme of tradition and distinction, conferring sanctity and immunity 
against change. Their court, however, apart from the order of the Golden Fleece 
and some other isolated habits, hardly resembled the Burgundian example. 
Habsburg courtiers revered a tradition distant from their actual practice, and 
exceedingly spongy in its definition. In France, conversely, Burgundy was not 
usually referred to – it was after all a French secundogeniture, an appanage granted 
to a younger son whose successors defiantly turned it into a magnificent court 
temporarily outshining France. The Burgundian court, however, had originated in 
French court practices, and hence the courts showed great resemblance.
11
  
 
The discussion of traditions brings to mind the etic-emic distinction. Deriving 
from linguistics, the terms ‗phonetic‘ and ‗phonemic‘ have been used widely to 
discriminate between the perspectives respectively of detached observers versus 
participants, or  outsiders versus insiders.
12
 The Burgundian example shows that 
traditions treasured by groups in the past do not necessarily coincide with 
influences and connections we can verify from our contemporary academic 
perspective. Conversely academics can establish connections that were irrelevant to 
historical actors. The Central Asian heritage shared by, for instance, the Qing and 
Ottoman dynasties with their traditions of horsemanship and archery could not be 
perceived or valued by these distant dynasties themselves. The strong affective and 
legitimizing potential of traditions does not necessarily match their concrete 
impact; nor does the absence of a consciously cultivated tradition exclude shared 
roots or earlier influences. This fits in and complicates the problem of diffusion and 
separate development.  
                                                 
10
 Marshall G. S. HODGSON. The Venture of Islam. I. The Classical Age of Islam (Chicago 
1975); Robert L. Canfield, ed., Turko-Persia in historical perspective (Cambridge 1991); 
Muzaffar ALAM, ‗The Pursuit of Persian: Language in Mughal Politics‘, Modern Asian 
Studies, 32, 2 (1998) 317-349; Lisa BALABANLILAR, ‗Lords of the Auspicious 
Conjunction: Turco-Mongol Imperial Identity on the Subcontinent‘ Journal of World 
History, 18, 1 (2007) 1-39.  
11
 Jeroen DUINDAM, 'The Burgundian-Spanish legacy in European court life: a brief 
reassessment and the example of the Austrian Habsburgs', Publication du Centre Europeen 
d'études Bourguignonnes (XIVe-XVIe s.). Rencontre d' Innsbruck, 46 (2006) pp.  203-220 
12
 See discussion and applications in Thomas N. HEADLAND, Kenneth L. PIKE, Marvin 
HARRIS.ed., Emics and Etics: the insider/ outsider debate.(Newbury Park, CA 1990).  
Jeroen Duindam 
 
H E I D E L B E R G  P A P E R S  I N  S O U T H  A S I A N  A N D  C O M P A R A T I V E  P O L I T I C S  
h t t p : / / w w w . s a i . u n i - h e i d e l b e r g . d e / S A P O L / H P S A C P . h t m  
W o r k i n g  P a p e r  N o .  4 8 ,  J u n e  2 0 0 9                                                                7 
 
 
The opening paragraphs of this paper implicitly stated an argument that makes 
a combination of synchronic and diachronic comparison mandatory for my project. 
Studying any phenomenon in Europe and Asia only in the early modern age 
immediately raises the question of a structurally increasing power asymmetry in 
favour of Europe. Questions related to differentiated trajectories of modernization, 
long predominant in economic and political studies, do not ideally fit the 
comparative study of an institution semi-universal in pre-modern history. This 
relatively recent change in global balances rapidly obscures other questions. A 
diachronic, longitudinal perspective is necessary to put into perspective tendencies 
that seem either typically early modern, or typically European rather than Asian 
from a longer-term viewpoint. Only a diachronic perspective allows us to identify 
clichés of court history, recurring aspects that should not be mistaken for modern 
developments. How can we accept unreservedly, for instance, Norbert Elias‘ 
specific interpretation of court ceremony, Affektbeherrschung and the changes in 
modern European civilization when close parallels in courts throughout world 
history strike the eye?
13
  
Other comparative strategies have been used to go beyond ‗East-West 
dichotomies‘.14 The pattern of Braudel‘s study of the Mediterranean has been 
extended to the Indian and Atlantic Oceans.
15
 These studies have placed emphasis 
on the multiple connections and influences rather than concentrating on clashes 
between religions and polities. The Mediterranean itself remains a rich basis for 
studying connections between Byzantine, ‗Frankish‘, Mamluk, North-West African 
and Ottoman dynastic heritages from later medieval to early modern times. World-
historical perspectives help to highlight global movement of silver, germs, gems, 
weapons, peoples, and many other items. Among these perspectives, an Inner 
Asian view, looking at the impact of peoples migrating from the steppe heart of the 
Asian landmass towards cultures in all directions is relevant for the comparison of 
East and West Asia.
16
 This project acknowledges these perspectives; it primarily 
looks at recurring elements in household structures, seeks to include connections 
                                                 
13
 Norbert ELIAS, Die höfische Gesellschaft. Untersuchungen zur Soziologie des 
Königtums und der höfischen Aristokratie. Mit einer Einleitung: Soziologie und 
Geschichtswissenschaft (Darmstadt, Neuwied 1969); ELIAS, Norbert, Über den Prozeß der 
Zivilisation. Soziogenetische und Psychogenetische Untersuchungen (Bern 1969); see 
discussion in DUINDAM, Myths of Power.  
14
 This terminology comes from Victor LIEBERMAN, ‗Transcending East-West 
Dichotomies: State and Culture Formation in Six Ostensibly Disparate Areas‘, Modern 
Asian Studies, 31, 3 (1997) pp. 463-546.  
15
 See classics Fernand BRAUDEL, La Méditerranée et le Monde Méditerranéen à 
l'époque de Philippe II (Paris 1949); K. N. CHAUDHURI, Asia before Europe: economy 
and civilisation of the Indian Ocean from the rise of Islam to 1750 (Cambridge 1990); see a 
perceptive perspective in Sanjay SUBRAHMANYAM, ‗Connected Histories: Notes 
towards a Reconfiguration of Early Modern Eurasia‘, Modern Asian Studies, 31, 3 (1997), 
pp. 735-762; recent assessments: Bhaswati BHATTACHARYA, Gita DHARAMPAL-
FRICK, Jos GOMMANS, ‗Spatial and temporal continuities of merchant networks in South 
Asia and the Indian Ocean (1500-2000)‘, Journal of the Economic and Social History of the 
Orient, 50, 2-3 (2007) pp. 91-105; Atlantic History: A Critical Appraisal, Jack D. 
GREENE, Philip D. MORGAN, ed. (Oxford 2008).  
16
See recently e.g. Christopher E. BECKWITH, Empires of the Silk Road: A History of 
Central Eurasia from the Bronze Age to the Present (Princeton 2009).  
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and influences when relevant, and only in the very last instance may deal with 
changing asymmetries between Europe and Asia.  
 
Comparative research dealing with ‗big questions‘ usually relies on secondary 
literature.
17
 Recently several important works have been published on the history of 
the court that together provide wide-ranging coverage in terms of regions and 
periods.
18
 Yet even this specialized academic literature doesn‘t offer an entirely 
sufficient basis for comparison. Studying simultaneously the archival legacies of 
the dynastic courts in Vienna and Versailles, I noted that in many respects, only at 
this detailed level did comparison start to make sense. Numbers and expenses, for 
instance, could be turned into comparable aggregates only by first ascertaining the 
categories used in archival listings, indicating court servants in various staffs and 
auxiliary services, wages, and expenditure. Numbers suggested in the literature 
were often faulty, but even correct statements offered no basis for comparison, as 
the logic of the computations behind the totals differed. The presence or absence of 
archival materials at these two courts, as well as the nature of these materials, 
helped me to rephrase and refine research questions. In the end, several results 
emerged that were wholly unexpected, correcting some of my initial hypotheses as 
well as contradicting the general reputations of Bourbon and Habsburg courts in 
history. Comparative history, I concluded, should consistently try to include 
published as well as unpublished materials in its research. This is easier said than 
done: comparative research based on primary sources and ideally also on 
unpublished materials presents a major challenge within Europe, swelling to truly 
daunting proportions as soon as we cross more fundamental borders of culture and 
language.  
 
It is possible to make this work only by organizing a cooperative effort, 
bridging the gaps of language and culture by bringing together a set of specialists. 
In recent years I have cooperated with ottomanists and sinologists who in many 
instances corrected my intellectual reflexes formed by a European background 
deepened by a preoccupation with mostly European history. With such a group 
coaching young researchers from relevant territories in Asia as well as in Europe, 
jointly elaborating a framework for comparative research in their own sources, 
important results can be achieved. Cooperation along these lines, close in spirit to 
the Heidelberg projects currently underway, can uncover unexpected contrasts and 
similarities. Language competence and familiarity with the cultural backgrounds 
are necessary to connect the wider comparative perspective with detailed 
knowledge of relevant sources. It is equally indispensable for the cultural 
translation of terms and concepts – what are the equivalents for court, courtier, 
court ladies, eunuchs, nobles, ruler, household, government or state – and specific 
offices in these domains? What are the connotations and judgments inherent in 
                                                 
17
  See a classic statement and methodical explanation of this approach in Charles Tilly, Big 
structures, large processes, huge comparisons (New York 1983).  
18
 Evelyn RAWSKI, The Last Emperors. A Social History of Qing Imperial Institutions 
(Berkeley, Los Angeles 1998); David M. Robinson, Culture, Courtiers, and Competition: 
The Ming Court (1368-1644) (Harvard 2008) Harvard East Asian Monographs; S. 
BABAIE, K. BABAYAN, Slaves of the Shah; Rhoads MURPHEY, Exploring Ottoman 
Sovereignty. Tradition, Image and Practice in the Ottoman Imperial Household 1400-1800 
(London, New York 2008); also the volumes edited bv Walthall, and Spawforth.   
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these terms? Intense cooperation before and during the phase of research can lead 
to a multicultural glossary of terms including explications where no clear parallels 
are available. Ongoing comparison makes it possible to continually develop the 
catalogue of questions and foci, for which this paper provides a starting point.  
 
The scope of this comparative effort has no limitation in principle, only in 
practice, at the level of finance and organization. A minimum coverage needs to 
guarantee: 
 
1) the correction of a specifically early modern perspective as well as  
2) a sufficient spread of examples in Europe and Asia. 
 
In a first attempt to obtain a European Research Council advanced investigator 
grant, I included a longitudinal-diachronic perspective concentrating on West Asia 
and its European connections, from Assyrian to Ottoman times, as well as an early 
modern lateral-synchronic perspective including at least Ming-Qing China, 
Tokugawa Japan, the Ottomans and Europe. Clearly, Safavid, Mughal, South-
Indian, South-East Asian examples could be added, as well as, in the margins of 
the fragmented European perspective, Russia with its steppe connections. Also, the 
longitudinal perspective could be extended to include early imperial China, or 
earlier phases of Indian history. Africa and Pre-Columbian America can offer 
valuable additions – the Pre-Columbian heritage has special relevance as the only 
example developing in seclusion, without connections to the Eurasian and African 
cultures. 
 
Ming and Qing China, the Ottoman empire and most of the other dynastic 
complexes cited here were organized around a single dynasty and one leading 
dynastic centre. In Tokugawa Japan, with its peculiar form of dual rulership based 
in Edo and Kyoto, the shogun in Edo served as main political-military point of 
orientation for the entire realm. Medieval and early modern Europe could look 
upon itself as a Res Publica Christiana; pope and emperor could with some 
legitimacy pose as the twofold rulers of at least a section of their world. At no 
moment in its history, however, did Europe function as a coherent empire, oriented 
towards a single ruler and centre (or even two rulers and two centres). How can we 
compare the multiplicity of households, in various styles and traditions, with the 
apparent unity of the single major dynastic household in empires? The contrast is 
relevant but needs to be put into perspective. Rulership existed at many levels, both 
in the diverse European commonweal and in empires. All longer-lasting empires 
went through phases of devolution characterized by the emergence of multiple 
competing dynasties – in the Indian subcontinent as in Europe, this seems to have 
been the rule rather than the exception.
19
 In every empire, princely households 
existed at various levels. The level of autonomy and power of kings, dukes, and 
                                                 
19
 Note the comparison of India and the Holy Roman Empire in Edmund BURKE, Select 
Works of Edmund Burke (Indianapolis 1999) 4. Chapter: Speech on Fox’s East India Bill. 
Accessed from http://oll.libertyfund.org/title/659/20402 on 2009-03-19. Discussion of 
European perception early modern India: Gita DHARAMPAL-FRICK, Indien im Spiegel 
deutscher Quellen der Frühen Neuzeit (1500–1750) Studien zu einer interkulturellen 
Konstellation (Tübingen 1994), particularly chapter 4.  
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counts, beys, viceroys, and governors varied widely. The dynastic household itself 
is my basic unit of comparison, not necessarily the dynastic household of a large-
scale empire, let alone a ‗civilization‘. The difference in scale between, for 
instance, France under Louis XIV with its ca 20 million population, and Qing 
China under Kangxi with ca 150 million need not undermine comparison. 
 
Two fundamental qualifications circumscribe the nature of the dynastic 
centres to be compared. First of all, I consider only dynasties with the ambition and 
potential to extend their rule over many generations. Dignitaries acting as 
temporary representatives of a central dynasty, who can transfer their power to 
another generation only by subterfuge and without openly claiming dynastic 
legitimacy, do not enter into my comparison even if they reside in palaces and are 
served by hundreds. This does not exclude courts where succession was arranged 
through election or acclamation, such as the the Papal, Mamluk and Holy Roman 
Imperial courts. A second reservation concerns the conglomerate of territories and 
peoples under the rule of a dynasty. I concentrate my effort on dynasties ruling 
over several regions or peoples, not because of any strict measurement in scale, but 
because I want to assess the household‘s potential to integrate mixed populations 
comprising various ethnic or religious groups.
20
 This qualification leaves room for 
comparing European dynastic states and Asian empires. Empires almost by 
definition include a multiplicity of peoples. Yet in fact most European dynastic 
states were composite monarchies. The early modern Austrian Habsburgs 
combined the royal crowns of Bohemia and Hungary, the archducal hats of various 
Austrian duchies, and the imperial crown of the Holy Roman Empire. Other rulers 
always listed an array of titles underlining the variety of territories in their 
portfolio, and more often than not had to deal with regionalized identities and 
privileges.  
 
It might seem unsatisfactory to end this introductory section without 
establishing a genealogy of scholarly works serving as basis for this effort, or 
highlighting the innovative concepts and ideas used. I hesitate to do so here, 
because the first would lead to obvious names from Max Weber to Michael Mann, 
from Jack Goody to Clifford Geertz, as well as to a long list of anthropological 
studies and historical monographs.
21
 The second would turn out to be rather 
modest: the innovative impulse here cannot be situated in a list of authors and their 
concepts, or in a virtuoso exercise in intellectual concept-juggling but in the 
combination of preceding observations with the fields outlined below, to be 
implemented in cooperative research. 
                                                 
20
 John BEATTIE, Understanding an African kingdom: Bunyoro (New York 1960) p. 32 
stresses the representation of clans and crafts at court; their contact with the dynastic centre 
served to integrate the people of Bunyoro. The mechanism singled out for research here 
also relevant for smaller territories.  
21
 Notably Max Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Grundriss der verstehenden Soziologie 
( Tübingen 1922); Michael Mann, Sources of Social Power. A history of power from the 
beginning to AD 1760 (Cambridge 1986); Jack Goody, e.g. Succession to high office 
(Cambridge 1966) or his Comparative Studies in Kinship (Stanford 1969); Clifford 
GEERTZ, Negara. The theatre-state in nineteenth-century Bali (Princeton 1980), p. 130; 
see also GEERTZ, Local knowledge. Further essays in interpretive anthropology (New 
York 1983).  
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FOUR CONCENTRIC CIRCLES: RULER, DYNASTY, PALACE STAFFS, 
CONNECTIONS 
 
 
THE RULER: LIFE CYCLE, PERSON AND POSITION, CATALOGUE OF 
VIRTUES 
 
A ruler may be presented as the son of heaven; the shadow of god on earth; the 
agent of divine power on earth: he remains an ordinary human being following the 
unbending trajectory of birth, growth, death. While coups or elections usually 
install persons at the height of their physical and intellectual powers, hereditary 
succession can bring to power persons at any stage of the human life cycle: young 
children still being raised by their dynastic elders; inexperienced adolescents; 
adults at the peak of their capabilities; elderly persons. The two most marked rulers 
of the later seventeenth century, Louis XIV and Kangxi, went through all these 
stages. The life cycle exerts a powerful influence: youngsters approaching 
adulthood seek to break free from the tutelage of their mentors; senior rulers easily 
slip into the vulnerabilities of old age, pressured by eager successors and a court 
awaiting their deaths. A miniature dynastic cycle of weakness-strength-weakness 
hides within many reigns. Favourites rise to power more easily in the proximity 
either of very young or very old rulers. This holds true even for strong figures. 
Qing emperor Qianlong in the latter part of his reign allowed the accumulation of 
power in the hands of his Manchu guardsman Heshen. Only after the death of his 
mentor Mazarin did Louis XIV proclaim his independence; later in his life he again 
increasingly relied on his morganatic wife Mme de Maintenon – a fact usually 
passed over in silence.
22
 For women at court -- spouses, concubines, regents and 
rulers -- reproduction and pregnancies formed a major factor in the life cycle. Post-
sexual status, motherhood, and widowhood consolidated their position; conversely, 
an active role as ruling queen or regent could be seen as irreconcilable with 
reproduction and sexuality.
23
 
 
Astute rulers can father weaklings. All rulers, strong or weak, bright or dim-
witted, had to cope with expectations, obligations, and temptations. These proved 
to be too heavy for many among them. The more elevated the ritual position 
ascribed to the ruler, the more burdensome it could turn out in practice for the 
incumbent. The show of omnipotence around the ruler severely limited his personal 
freedom of movement; this is one of the conclusions emerging from Clifford 
Geertz‘s interpretation of the Balinese ‗theatre-state‘. The king, then, was like the 
king of chess: central yet vulnerable and static.
24
 In all ritualized forms of rulership, 
                                                 
22
 See e.g. Mark Bryant, ‗Partner, Matriarch and Minister: The Unofficial Consort, Mme de 
Maintenon of France, 1669-1715‘ in C. Campbell-Orr ed., European Queenship: The Role 
of The Consort 1660-1815 (Cambridge 2004).  
23
 See e.g. Judith M. RICHARDS, ‗―To promote a Woman to Beare Rule‖: Talking of 
Queens in Mid-Tudor England‘, Sixteenth Century Journal, 28, 1 (1997) 101-121; Leslie 
PEIRCE, The Imperial Harem. Women and Sovereignty in the Ottoman Empire (Oxford 
1993) stressing the link between ‗postsexual status‘ and political power.  
24
 GEERTZ, Negara, p. 130; see also GEERTZ, ‗Centers, kings, and charisma: reflections 
on the symbolics of power‘ in: Local knowledge, pp. 121-146; see comments on Geertz e.g. 
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we need to differentiate sharply between the inflated status of the position, and the 
actual role of the person: these kings and emperors reigned, but often could not 
truly rule. At the same time, the servants prostrating themselves in the presence of 
the ruler could turn out to be more powerful in practice than the person they 
inflated to unnatural proportions. Supreme status and celestial legitimation came 
with heavy responsibilities. An unexpected eclipse, natural disasters, droughts, 
floods, indicating heaven‘s displeasure, could force the Chinese emperor to purge 
corrupt bureaucrats and introduce reforms, but in the end he himself had to restore 
harmony through sacrifices and rituals.
25
 Elements of this great responsibility are 
reflected in the attitudes of European rulers, centred on justice and accessibility. 
Religious legitimation created demands that were taken quite seriously by most 
rulers, even if they quite often failed to live up to them.  
 
In addition to such burdens, rulers would have to deal with decision making 
and paperwork. The three ‗high‘ Qing emperors clearly worked very hard, and 
were keen to present this image. Louis XIV, possibly lackadaisical by their 
standards, insisted on the necessity of continuous hard work in the memoirs he 
wrote for his son. Habsburg Emperor Leopold I complained in letters to a confidant 
about the unending hours of reading and commenting on state papers. A fifth-
century Roman emperor allegedly invented a refueling oil lamp, allowing 
continuous work into the night; other inventions to prevent sleep figure in the 
literature idealizing hard-working rulers.
26
 Most rulers were confronted with 
continuous pressure from servants who approached them with their own intentions. 
The Sun King cautioned his son, stating that servants who: ‗were the first to see his 
weaknesses, were also the first who sought to use them to their own advantage‘.27 
Silence and seclusion made some rulers, particularly in Asia, less vulnerable to 
outside pressures ; yet this defensive measure heightened the power of the inner 
court servants. Hunting, probably the single most important diversion of rulers 
throughout history, combining physical exertion with relatively easy 
companionship, brought relaxation from hard work as well as social pressures.
28
  
 
                                                                                                                            
in S.J. TAMBIAH, Culture, thought and social action. An anthropological perspective. 
(Cambridge, Mass. 1983). 
25
 RAWSKI, The Last Emperors, pp. 197-294, see e.g. rituals following droughts on pp. 
225-227; for a wider discussion of ritual kingship and the Frazerian notion of sacrificing the 
ritual king, see Declan QUIGLEY, ‗Scapegoats: The Killing of Kings and Ordinary People‘ 
Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, 6, 2 (2000) pp. 237-254.  
26
 The refueling lamp was mentioned in a paper by Jill HARRIES (St Andrews) during a 
November 2009 conference on Empires and Law: principles, practices Law: ‗Going outside 
the order: Romaen law from city state to world empire‘. See many examples of the rhetoric 
and also the practice of hard work in Louis XIV, Mémoires de Louis XIV pour l’instruction 
du Dauphin, Charles DREYSS, ed., (Paris 1860) two vols, e.g. II, pp. 99, 119-120; 
Jonathan SPENCE, Emperor of China. Self-Portrait of Kang-Hsi (New York 1974), 46, 
110-111; for Habsburg emperor Leopold I see e.g. Alfred F. PRIBRAM, ed., Privatbriefe 
Kaiser Leopold I. an den Grafen F. E. Pötting, (Vienna 1903) two vols, I pp. 118, 375. 
27
 DREYSS, Mémoires de Louis XIV, I, pp. 196-197; II, pp. 64-65. 
28
 See RAWSKI, Last Emperors, pp. 20-22; MURPHEY, Ottoman Sovereignty, pp. 152-
153; generally Thomas T. ALLSEN, The Royal Hunt in Eurasian History. (Philadelphia 
2006). Staffs for several forms of hunting existed at all courts known to me; hunting was 
usually connected to a seasonal calendar and to change of location.  
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Do ‗princely mirrors‘ in different cultural settings reflect a comparable 
catalogue of virtues, combining religious attitudes and the ideal of a harmonious 
relationship with the population with dynastic qualities such as valour and 
liberality? Stereotypes of good and bad rulers invite comparative scrutiny, as does 
the tension between the ritualized position and the vulnerability of incumbent 
rulers, or the fundamental impact of the life cycle.  
 
 
DYNASTIES: REPRODUCTION, SUCCESSION, SIBLINGS 
 
Dynastic power is based on inheritance of high status, a situation contingent on 
procreation. Eunuchs as well as clergymen restricted by celibacy frequently 
managed to transmit their wealth or status to members of their extended families or 
took recourse in the adoption of favourites.
29
 Rulers could sometimes also choose 
to create successors through adoption rather than through reproduction; yet on the 
whole they hoped to see their children installed in their place. The organization of 
reproduction left open many choices: monogamous marriage versus polygyny; 
endogamous marriages with near-equals versus slave concubinage — and 
combinations of these. Interestingly, we see a development from dynastic marriage 
to harem-based slave concubinage both in the Abbasid and the Ottoman empires. 
The dynasty was henceforth defined exclusively in patrilineal terms; concubines 
were slaves as well as outsiders. Patterns of marriage and concubinage have been 
traced for several Chinese dynasties. Preceding phases of control by dowager-
empresses and their lineages in Chinese history, decried by gentlemen-literati who 
hated to see power in the hands of their inner-court rivals, apparently convinced the 
new Qing rulers to adopt concubinage in addition to marriage as basis for 
procreation. Concubines were selected from all social levels of the conquest elite, 
organized in the Manchu, Mongol, and Hanjun (Chinese) military formations or 
banners; successors were not necessarily sons of high-ranking spouses.
30
  
 
In Europe, the practice of marriage among equals hardened into dynastic 
marriage among sovereign dynasties. Concomitantly, primogeniture slowly became 
the dominant practice, although election, acclamation, and direct choice by the 
incumbent ruler were all practiced. Likewise, the carving up of territories among 
successors upon the death of a ruler, or mitigated variants of such practices 
granting younger sons appanages in crownlands, remained habitual. Elsewhere, the 
varieties of marriage and concubinage led to multiple systems of succession. 
Succession is the key to and Achilles‘ heel of dynastic power: offspring are a 
necessary precondition for continuity, but they can present a daunting challenge at 
the same time. Monogamous dynastic marriage turned infertility and premature 
                                                 
29
 Jennifer W. JAY, ‘Another side of Chinese eunuch history: Castration, marriage, 
adoption, and burial‘, Canadian Journal of History, 28, 3 (1993) 459-478; see Jin YI, 
Mémoires d’une dame de cour dans la cité interdite (Arles 1993) and Dan SHI, Mémoires 
d’un eunuque dans la cité interdite (Arles 1991) for many details of eunuchs towards the 
end of the Qing dynasty.  
30
 Rubie S. WATSON and Patricia BUCKLEY EBREY, ed., Marriage and Inequality in 
Chinese Society (Berkeley 1991), notably the chapters by Jennifer HOLMGREN and 
Evelyn RAWSKI; Shuo WANG, ‗The Selection of Women for the Qing Imperial Harem‘, 
Chinese Historical Review, 11, 2 (2004) pp. 212-222 
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deaths into grave concerns, leading to serious crises, for instance, in France after 
1712, or in Austria under Charles VI. Most European wars between 1648 and 1789 
were triggered by succession disputes, themselves caused by the extinction of 
senior branches of dynasties. An abundance of potential successors, however, 
brought out other tensions and anxieties, in Europe and elsewhere. Succession 
quarrels dominate dynastic history: particularly in the steppe-based dynasties of 
Central Asia, the notion of collective sovereignty dictated a sharing of power 
among siblings. Among Mughal rulers, proudly pointing to Genghis as well as to 
Timur as forebears, violent succession struggles were endemic.
31
 The Ottomans 
practiced a form of succession-by-competition among sons of the deceased ruler. 
Splitting up the realm after the death of a ruler remained an option until Mehmed II 
formalized the practice of fratricide.
32
 All sons were potential successors, serving 
as governors in border provinces; they rushed to the capital or the army to secure 
support, and confront competitors. Rivals were killed in battle, or afterwards by the 
victor – fratricide emerged as a necessary practice. Around 1600, the practice 
dissolved in several stages. Sons were no longer sent out to rule in the provinces, 
but were kept in Topkapi palace. All males in the House of Osman were expected 
to stay there, until the sultan died and the eldest successor took his place. Seniority 
and hence the succession of brothers rather than sons replaced the earlier system. 
The Qing discarded Ming primogeniture; within the general practice that sons 
succeeded their fathers, the emperor‘s preference now ruled. This was not as 
painless as it may sound. Once a preference became clear, it was challenged from 
many sides. Even as powerful a character as Kangxi was repeatedly forced to 
change course, a situation causing him great worries. These experiences were 
equally undermining for his eventual successor Yongzheng, and distrust of siblings 
dominated the opening of his reign. In the end, Yongzheng and Qianlong – 
Kangxi‘s favourite grandson – turned succession into a secret, to be made public 
only upon the death of the emperor.
33
  
 
At the level of the first generation, children of a ruler offered opportunities for 
cementing alliances through marriages. Sultans‘ daughters habitually married 
among the highest state agents of the empire, viziers and pashas.
34
 Princes and 
princesses were exchanged to consolidate peace treaties in Europe, where an 
increasingly dense network of marriage connections turned all rulers into one 
family. Princes from the Manchu imperial lineage or Aisin Gioro concluded 
endogamous alliances with Manchu as their preferred partners in addition to 
numerous Mongol and few Chinese women. Qing princesses married among the 
                                                 
31
 See e.g. Munis D. FARUQUI, ‗The Forgotten Prince: Mirza Hakim and the Formation of 
the Mughal Empire in India’, Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, 48, 
4 (2005) pp. 487-523; Jorge FLORES, Sanjay SUBRAHMANYAM, ‘The Shadow Sultan: 
Succession and Imposture in the Mughal Empire, 1628-1640’, Journal of the Economic and 
Social History of the Orient, 47,1 (2004) pp. 80-121; Jorge FLORES, ‘"I will do as my 
father did": on Portuguese and other European views of Mughal succession crises’, e-
Journal of Portuguese History,  3, 2 (2005). 
32
 MURPHEY, Ottoman Sovereignty, p. 42. 
33
 RAWSKI, Last Emperors, 101-103; Spence, Emperor of China, pp. 115-140.  
34
 PEIRCE, The Imperial Harem, discusses at length the marriages of Ottoman princesses 
to the highest state servants, Sultanic  sons-in-law or Damads; see also on Saljuq and 
Abbasid women Eric J. HANNE, 'Women, power, and the eleventh and twelfth century 
Abbasid court', Hawwa 3, 1 (2005) pp. 80-110.  
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same groups, but the proportions were different, with the Mongol princes now 
ranking at the top. These alliances reflected the importance of the Mongol 
connection for the conquest of Ming China, extended into the protracted phase of 
fighting Western Mongolian tribes in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
35
 
 
Descendants of royal siblings, close to dynastic legitimacy yet without likely 
chances to rule, could pose serious problems for rulers. They were ideal personal 
representatives and viceroys; but for the very same reasons, also the most 
dangerous rivals for the throne. The Ottoman practice of competitive succession 
and fratricide, followed by the new pattern of seclusion and succession through 
seniority eliminated or at least mitigated the problem. Qing emperors sought to 
gain a strong grip on the imperial relatives. Princes could hold high office, but were 
also restricted in movement: princes lived in and around Beijing, catered for as 
well as controlled. Their noble titles, moreover, descended in rank one grade from 
generation to generation, although an exception was made for the most important 
families. In Europe, cadet branches that had figured prominently in rebellions, 
gradually turned to muted opposition or uncomfortable acquiescence. The Orléans 
in France -- from Gaston‘s open role in the Fronde, via the Orléans regeny and 
Philippe Égalité‘s vote in favour of the execution of Louis XVI, to the brief 
dynastic triumph of Louis Philippe in 1830 -- offer a typical example. As soon as 
regular succession was in some way undermined – by minorities, regencies, or 
popular discontent – princes were to be found in the vanguard of powerseekers.  
 
At a lesser level, similar tensions were endemic in the relations between rulers 
and high nobles in Europe. In the Ottoman and Qing empires, below the level of 
the dynastic clan (or that of preceding dynasties), hereditary status and noble 
descent were rarely stated as openly and assertively as in Europe. Machiavelli, 
Montesquieu and many others contrasted all-powerful Asian rulers served by 
slaves or their equivalents, to European kings who could rule only by establishing 
consensus with their noble elites – or by overpowering them. The Habsburg 
diplomat Busbecq and the Jesuit father Du Halde were positively impressed by 
what they perceived as the predominance of merit rather than birth in respectively 
the Ottoman and Chinese empires.
36
 Notwithstanding major differences in 
legitimation and representation of status, it seems clear that in all examples 
discussed here, agents of central government as well as regional elites were forces 
to be reckoned with. Their connections with the dynastic centre, as focus of 
administrative activity and as ritual centre, were an important element in the 
working of the pre-modern state. A thorough analysis of groups serving around the 
ruler, the focus of the third concentric circle, is necessary to understand these 
connections.  
 
                                                 
35
 Evelyn RAWSKI, ‗Ching Imperial Marriage and Problems of Rulership‘, in: Marriage 
and Inequality in Chinese Society, p p.170-203, at pp. 175-182.  
36
 BUSBECQ, The Turkish letters of Ogier Ghiselin de Busbecq, imperial ambassador at 
Constantinople, 1554-1562, E. Seymour Forster, ed.  (Baton Rouge 2005), pp. 59-60; Jean-
Baptiste DU HALDE, Description géographique, historique, chronologique, politique et 
physique de l'empire de la Chine et de la Tartarie chinoise… (The Hague 1736) 4 vols,  II, 
p. 69-75. 
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The organization of reproduction and succession, and the challenges posed by 
pretenders as well as more generally relatives sharing in dynastic prestige invite 
thematic comparative research. Changes in accepted practice such as those 
occurring in around 1600 in the Ottoman empire or during the first generations of 
Qing rule, form a good starting point.  
 
 
GROUPS AROUND THE RULER: TOPOGRAPHY AND GENDER, 
FUNCTION, STATUS, PROVENANCE 
 
At the heart of this sketch stands the amalgam of groups serving the ruler in 
different capacities: domestics, advisers, guards, religious agents, and a variety of 
others. While the pattern of problems connected to rulers as persons and to dynastic 
continuity coalesced around several general points, a discussion of groupings at the 
dynastic centre threatens to fragment into a multitude of examples, among which 
the differences may be more obvious than the parallels. I will seek to establish 
criteria for comparison here, and discuss some patterns that seem to recur 
notwithstanding major differences in organization.  
 
Topography and architecture suggest a first approach to the dynastic centre. 
Groundplans and palace structures show a more or less demarcated difference 
between ‗inner‘ and ‗outer‘ sections of the court. Frequently, ‗inner‘ and ‗outer‘ 
take form as courtyards, with subsequent gates limiting access. Structures in these 
courtyards can include additional thresholds of access, tying the approach of 
visitors to specific trajectories, typically with gates, stairs, and a sequence of rooms 
leading to the place where the ruler awaits guests. The inner part of the court, 
including by definition the residential area of the ruler himself, usually connected 
directly to that of his spouse(s) or concubines, was also the centre of decision 
making: the domestic heart served as the political heart as well. The cabinet du roi, 
the room where the king could work together with his advisers, was in the royal 
apartment. This shows the limitations of the modern concepts of ‗private‘ and 
‗public‘, if these are read as labels for ‗personal‘ and ‗political‘ spheres. There was 
no such opposition in the household, even if specialized political-administrative 
services gradually came to operate at increasing distance from the dynastic heart of 
the political setup.  
 
Women at court likewise tended to occupy the least accessible parts of the 
palace compound. This holds true for the European Frauenzimmer, a term referring 
both to the women and to their location,
37
 as well as for the harem in Topkapi or 
the women in the forbidden city. The centrality of the ‗inner court‘ entailed the 
proximity of women and power counteracting the common gender bias against 
women in power. The bias operated mostly for younger, sexually active, women, 
                                                 
37
 See Jan HIRSCHBIEGEL,  Werner PARAVICINI, ed., Das Frauenzimmer. Die Frau bei 
Hofe in Spätmittelalter und früher Neuzeit 6. Symposium der Residenzen-Kommission der 
Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen (Stuttgart 2000); Katrin KELLER, Hofdamen. 
Amtsträgerinnen im Wiener Hofstaat des 17. Jahrhunderts (Vienna, Cologne, Weimar 
2005).  
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leaving more leeway to mothers and widows.
38
 Interestingly, both the Ottoman 
sultan and the Qing emperor withdrew further into the inner court in the course of 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries respectively, strengthening the connection 
between occupants of the inner court – notably women – and power. At many 
courts eunuchs functioned as the trait d’union between the environment of women 
and men, between inner and outer courts, and hence between the sacralized ruler 
and less elevated persons.
39
 More generally, chamber servants controlling access to 
the ruler‘s inner quarters could develop great power, whatever their background. 
Physical access to the ruler, particularly lasting access which could develop into 
convivial proximity, was a vital asset for any person. Palace groundplans combined 
with ceremonial or institutional records can help to establish the contours of inner 
and outer courts in terms of localities, trajectories, and staffs. This provides a 
necessary background to all discussions of power, administrative positions, and 
decision making.
40
  
 
Functions of groups around the ruler can be compared at a general level, by 
studying the organization of household staffs and government services. 
Gatekeepers and guards, cupbearers and chamberlains, can be found at most courts, 
as well as ritual or religious specialists, scribes, secretaries, and financial 
controllers. Establishing lists of functions and titles of groups serving the ruler in 
domestic, religious, administrative or military capacities, we can translate them 
into a comparative matrix of functions at court.  
 
In addition to staffs and functions, status groups and hierarchies are an 
essential element of any dynastic court. Can we distinguish groups with sharply 
differentiated status around the ruler: such as slaves, freedmen, bondservants, 
commoners, nobles, princes? In Europe the noble-commoner divide seems most 
relevant, complicated by artists and other specialists reaching high status through 
special achievements or proximity. At the Ottoman court all posed as the sultan‘s 
slaves, yet under this blanket status category pages in the palace schools, black and 
white eunuchs, women in the harem, various categories of servants of the outer 
court or birun held very different positions. At the Qing court, eunuchs, Banner 
bondservants, empress and concubines, Banner nobles and the imperial princes in 
the interior can be juxtaposed to the literati in the ministries. Hierarchies in and 
among these status groups – surely a vital consideration in all dynastic 
environments, and a cornerstone of ceremonial occasions – invite further study. 
Hierarchies of function (i.e. a chain of command in certain staffs) can clash with 
hierarchies of status (i.e. noble-commoner); this occurred regularly at European 
courts. What were the occasions and forms of conflict? Did conflict at court follow 
the fissures between status groups, between inner court and outer court, between 
household and government? Or did it follow a volatile pattern changing according 
to the occasion, and crossing the major divides? Conflict was endemic at European 
                                                 
38
 The role of mothers and widows is stressed in PEIRCE, Imperial Harem and 
WALTHALL, Servants of the Dynasty.  
39
 Keith HOPKINS, Conquerors and Slaves (Cambridge 1981) chapter IV on the ‗political 
power of eunuchs‘.  
40
 Beatrice S. BARTLETT, Monarchs and Ministers: The Grand Council in Mid-Ch'ing 
China, 1723-1820 (Berkeley; Los Angeles 1994). 
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courts, though it varied in intensity from court to court -- were Asian courts more 
orderly and disciplined? Fomenting conflict at court has been interpreted by 
Norbert Elias and many others as a conscious strategy of princes, who 
systematically used strife among rivaling elites to strengthen their own power. 
Looking at the court through the criteria given here, we can ascertain various 
sources of rivalry and seek to verify whether rulers indeed tried to use these 
systematically. In that case they contributed to a situation deplored in moral 
manuals of rulership.  
 
Recruitment, provenance and training of personnel can provide vital insights. 
Did the dynastic centre include or exclude specific groups, regions, religions? Did 
it stand apart from society through its composition? The mostly Banner-recruited 
staff of the inner court in China contrasted with the predominance of Han Chinese 
in the bureaucracy, recruited through the civil service examinations. The 
predominance of slaves recruited among the Christian population of the empire 
through the devshirme system in the Ottoman household services as well as 
household troops set the court apart from its environment, although the system 
would soon allow recruitment in other forms as well.
41
 The sultan‘s concubines, 
likewise, tended to come from peripheral areas. In both cases the centre was staffed 
to some extent by outsiders, groups ideally loyal to the ruling dynasty more than to 
anything else. The practice of employing eunuchs, another type of outsiders, as 
harem attendants, go-betweens, and advisers existed among others in Assyria, 
China and India.
42
 Chinese eunuchs shielded the emperor from prying literati; their 
inner-court power acted as a brake on outer-court bureaucratic power. Using 
persons not allowed or unable to procreate in the service of rulers, was more 
generally adopted to prevent the emergence of hereditary power networks among 
elites; clerics play a major role as agents of power in European history. Exiles and 
travelers rose to power at many courts. After his defeat Hannibal of Carthage 
entered the inner circle of Antiochus the Great; deposed European rulers stayed at 
the courts of friendly rulers. Marco Polo and Ibn Battuta were invited to take up 
positions at the courts they visited. Distance from local connections and loyalties 
made outsiders useful as a counterpoise against vested groups. Conversely, the 
overt rise to power of outsiders frequently gave rise to complaints and unruliness at 
European courts, when dynastic marriages introduced new rulers with their circles 
of friends from other territories.  
 
While recruitment could be based on preliminary training, most courts offered 
some sort of schooling and training to specific groups. Young pages in the stables 
can be found at European courts: they stayed at court several years for training, 
before moving to army command or court office. Slightly older noble girls were 
                                                 
41
 I. Metin KUNT, The Sultan’s Servants: The Transformation of Ottoman Provincial 
Government, 1550-1650, (New York 1983).  
42
 On eunuchs see e.g. Jane HATHAWAY, Beshir Agha. Chief Eunuch of the Ottoman 
Imperial Harem (Oxford 2006); Shaun TOUGHER, ed., Eunuchs in Antiquity and Beyond 
(London 2002); on Assyria see Gojko BARJAMOVIC, ‗Pride, pomp and circumstance. 
Palace, court and household in Assyria, 879-612 BCE‘ in: Royal Courts in Dynastic States 
and Empires; on Indian court eunuchs Kira HALL, ‗Go suck your husband‘s sugarcane. 
Hijras and the use of sexual insult‘ in: Queerly phrased : language, gender, and sexuality, 
Anna LIVIA, Kira HALL, ed. (Oxford 1997) pp. 430-460, at pp. 432-436.  
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trained in the establishments of queens and princesses, usually ending their court 
career in marriage. Training of pages and young women in the harem can be found 
at all courts discussed here. Indeed, the court often functioned as a centre for 
training, initiating youngsters into court culture, arts, or administrative and military 
expertise.  
 
The youngsters trained at court did not necessarily spend the rest of their lives 
there. This phenomenon leads to another question: do we focus on groups 
permanently present at court, visible on the ruler‘s payroll, or do we aim to chart a 
wider elite grouping sharing in only some of the activities of the court?
43
 Were 
such ‗court societies‘ a general phenomenon of dynastic centres, or did they 
emerge only in specific situations? In European historiography, the household 
institution has frequently been mixed up with the images evoked by Castiglione‘s 
Book of the Courtier. Castiglione‘s book does not describe court life -- not 
primarily because it presents a lofty ideal rather than regular practice, but more 
importantly because it captures a unique moment, a chance meeting of the fine 
fleur of Italian elites. This was neither a household, nor a group institutionally 
bound together and sharing a daily calendar. Clearly, however, visitors and 
incidental occasions were very relevant for the court. Around the modest 
institutional core of permanently present servants multitudes could be expected to 
attend court incidentally. This process was regularized to some extent through 
various forms of honorary membership, job rotation, and a set calendar of festive 
and ceremonial occasions. The household institution served as the modest starting 
point only for a series of activities that brought in temporarily numerous others, 
who were not usually on the ruler‘s payroll. These typically included ‗courtiers‘, 
cavalieri, gentlemen: an upper layer frequenting the court, formed by its habits yet 
themselves contributing to a courtly style. Can this dynamic interaction, common 
in Europe, also be found at Asian courts, with their more secluded inner courts, and 
more withdrawn rulers? Rhoads Murphey‘s recent study of the Ottoman court 
suggests a parallel phenomenon in the müteferrikas or distinguished persons, 
though they seem to represent a very select upper echelon less subject to inflation 
than European honorary connections.
44
 This question becomes relevant again in the 
last section of this fourfold layout, connections.  
 
Palace topography, gender, function, status, hierarchies, provenance, and 
presence at court can be used to establish an anatomy of the court. Applying the 
results in these various fields as overlapping transparencies, it should be possible to 
reach a better understanding of many processes at court. More focused research 
options can follow where sources are likely to be rich. One example may be given 
here. A change of rulers often generated reforms, hence sources tend to be 
plentiful. Even if succession was straightforward, the changeover of a princely 
retinue to the new sovereign court posed all sorts of questions. Which persons and 
groups would go from the prince‘s retinue to the new court? What to do with the 
supernumeraries -- would they stay or go? Was there any support for them? Were 
they pensioned or relegated to another household? In Vienna, the dowager-
empress‘ household took over supernumeraries, allowing the new ruler a fresh start 
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 SPAWFORTH, The Court and Court Society, p. 8.  
44
 MURPHEY, Ottoman Sovereignty, 154-158.  
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with his own servants. In France, court office gradually became semi-hereditary. 
Did similar rules pertain to the administrative apparatus, or had this become more 
detached from the ruler as a person? These questions seem relevant for all courts 
under consideration. 
 
 
COURT CONNECTIONS AND EXTENSIONS 
 
Most dynastic centres had one prime locus, a major palace in the capital city, such 
as Topkapi, the Forbidden City, or Versailles not far from Paris. These central 
palaces, however, were rarely the single location of the court. In and around the 
capital, more palaces would be available, sometimes occupied by other members of 
the leading dynasty with their own households. More distant venues promised a 
seasonal change of décor and climate, with the opportunity for different 
recreations, notably hunting. The dynasty and a group of servants that could change 
according to the occasion travelled around the country. At the same time, a steady 
movement of periphery to centre took place, drawing in many different groups to 
present their compliments to the ruler or his agents. Finally, at the level of the 
capital, we can expect ongoing economic, social, political and ritual interaction 
with the palace.  
 
How can we characterize the relations between court and capital? Topography 
clarifies loci of contact and trajectories of movement between palace and city – 
connecting major squares, religious edifices, hunting grounds and military zones to 
the palace. Could people move freely in the more open sections of the palace 
compound? Did they use these venues for other purposes, socializing, vending? In 
the capital, around the major palace, connections with the urban environment could 
take form through purveyance and an artisanal workforce – though indeed the court 
itself could deal with such matters, acting as a centre of production in its own 
right.
45
 Churchgoing, Friday prayer, the cycle of great sacrifices formed 
connections between palace and city, ruler and populace. More incidental 
occasions such as circumcision festivals, dynastic marriages, or the visit of 
important foreign missions provided flamboyant and protracted entertainment.
46
 
Which groups took part in the ceremonial movements between city and court, and 
in which capacity – as participants, close spectators, or as outsiders forcefully held 
at a distance? Who would later read about the shows, see their representation in 
images and writing or print? The segregation of Banner and Han Chinese 
populations in different sections of Bejing adds a dimension absent in Istanbul or 
European capitals.  
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 Preston M. TORBERT, The Ch’ing Imperial Household Department. A Study of its 
Organization and Principal Functions (Cambridge Mass.; London 1977).  
46
 On city, court and ceremony see Susan NAQUIN, Peking. Temples and City Life 
(Berkeley; Los Angeles; London; 2000) 324-31; Thomas A. Wilson, ‗Sacrifice and the 
Imperial Cult of Confucius‘ , History of Religions, 41, 3 (2002), pp. 251-287; MURPHEY, 
Ottoman Sovereigny, deals at length with the sur or circumcision ceremonies; on the 
Habsburgs in Vienna see DUINDAM, ‗Palace, city, dominions: the spatial dimension of 
Habsburg Rule‘ in: The Politics of Space: Courts in Europe and the Mediterranean, c. 
1500-1750, Malcolm Smuts, George Gorse, ed. (forthcoming Bulzoni 2009).  
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Dynastic centres ruled over a plurality of dominions. These could be attracted 
into the orbit of the court on their own terms, with specific forms intended chiefly 
or exclusively for them. Qing emperors cultivated their Manchu heritage and 
maintained the separate status of the Banners. They fostered connections with the 
Mongols not only through marriage policies; hunting expeditions in the North-East 
and a lasting Tibetan Buddhist connection most emphatically visualized in the 
summer resort of Chengde were also directed towards the Mongols. A ‗court of 
colonial affairs‘ was added to the administrative structure to deal specifically with 
Inner Asian peoples.
47
 Other recently acquired territories, notably the western 
province of Xinjiang, were treated differently from long-established zones.
48
 At the 
same time, however, Qing emperors posed as paragons of Han Chinese classical 
traditions. The heartlands of Chinese culture and wealth were visited on inspection 
tours strengthening dynastic rapport with these territories, as well as exerting 
control.
49
 The regular machinery of government operated in addition to these 
special impulses. 
 
In the Habsburg monarchy, until the 1740 characterized by ‗light‘ 
government, the dynastic centre attracted increasingly numerous honorary officers, 
who spent time at court only incidentally, but needed their court rank to commence 
their cursus honorum in dynastic service. The stamp of a shared court background 
became an effective way to bring together various elites into a 
‗gesamthabsurgische Adel‘. Their court-derived rank, furthermore, commingled 
and gradually overruled regional rankings. Coercion may have stood at the 
beginning of this process, but it soon developed a dynamic motivated by interests, 
chance, and ideals rather than by threats. The right to attend court as a participant, 
conferred by honorary office, had become indispensable. The court‘s specific 
cultural stamp, visible in architecture and apparel, as well as habits, spread more 
easily thanks to these numerous middlemen and -women. Connections through 
honorary membership exist for all European courts, perhaps most notably in the 
orders of chivalry, epitomizing high noble status. A court-based ‗economy of 
honour‘ could certainly help to attract elites to the dynastic centre -- their 
confluence around the ruler strengthened prestige for all.
50
 
 
Not all connections can be subsumed under honour and ritual. The 
administrative apparatus itself was centred on the court: directing and controlling 
agents of princely power was a prime responsibility of the ruler and his intimates. 
In the classic Ottoman system graduation (chikma) promoted household-trained 
pages into the outer court (one among several possibilities), and from there to high 
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 See RAWSKI, Last Emperors, pp. 66-71 on Mongol nobles and the Lifanyuan.  
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 L. J. NEWBY, ‗The Begs of Xinjiang: Between Two Worlds‘, Bulletin of the School of 
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service in the regions. Having performed their tasks there, they returned to the 
centre to await a new assignment. Once in the centre, they could hope for 
promotion to a role of pasha – or at the very end of the ladder, vizier or grand 
vizier. While they would no longer as a rule be allowed to enter the inner court, 
their career ideally started and ended at the palace. There is no need here to repeat 
in detail the intricate details of control inherent in the Chinese administrative 
system, with short tenure in different regions and functions, evaluation, censorate, 
formalized correspondence -- innovations introduced in France and elsewhere in 
Europe from the later sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries resemble these practices, 
though formal training and exams were introduced only towards the end of the 
early modern age.
51
 The Qing added to these long-standing mechanisms yet 
another channel of control, first based on Kangxi‘s direct and secret 
communication with intimate Manchu connections on mission, circumventing the 
Han Chinese bureaucracy, then formalized as the ‗palace memorial system‘ under 
Yongzheng.
52
 Apparently, delegating power to agents in outlying regions remained 
a difficult process, one that needed to be adapted continually to prevent 
accumulation of power in the hands of nominal representatives of princely rule. 
Intimates from the inner circle at court – whether nobles, bondservants, eunuchs or 
slaves – frequently surfaced as trusted agents used to monitor or keep 
administrators in check. As soon as these agents rose to higher rank and formal 
power in this process, however, patrimonial strategies could become advantageous 
for them too.  
 
In my previous discussion of the ruler, I mentioned his duties towards justice 
and social harmony. Following this moral injunction, rulers could reach out to 
common people, promising equity and protection, by inviting them to put forward 
complaints about their superiors. Reading petitions, listening to complaints and 
administering justice, therefore, served as a double-edged sword, appeasing the 
populace while putting pressure on the bureaucrats. Organizing a level of personal 
access to petitioners and an administrative procedure to deal with written 
complaints were a major burden on rulers. ‗Enlightened despots‘ in Europe, who in 
their attempt to restore state finances frequently alienated their corps 
intermédiaires, encouraged easy access to strengthen their popular appeal and at 
the same time control their obstinate agents.
53
 They followed a strategy of 
‗protecting‘ the commoner akin to that of ‗benevolent despotism‘ in Asia.54 Justice, 
however, was not the only motivation that led people of various standing to the 
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 See a careful assessment of the examinations in Benjamin ELMAN, ‗Political, Social, 
and Cultural Reproduction via Civil Service Examinations in Late Imperial China‘, The 
Journal of Asian Studies, 50, 1. (1991), pp. 7-28, stressing social reproduction and 
knowledge of the classics.  
52
 See e.g. Silas Hsiu-liang WU, ‗The Memorial Systems of The Ch'ing Dynasty (1644-
1911)‘, Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, 27 (1967), pp. 7-75; BARTLETT, Monarchs 
and Ministers.  
53
 See e.g. the direct connections with the population cultivated by Habsburg emperor 
Joseph II: Derek BEALES, ‗Joseph Ⅱ, petitions and the public sphere‘ in: Hamish Scott, 
Brendan Simms, ed. Cultures of Power in Europe during the Long Eighteenth Century 
(Cambridge 2007) pp. 249-268. 
54
 On ‗benevolent despotism‘ see MURPHEY, Ottoman Sovereignty, pp. 35-39; Pierre-
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court. European dynastic rulers universally listed high among their priorities the 
careful distribution of honours in their hands. The highest titles, offices, and 
benefices ideally would be distributed by the ruler himself. At fixed moments in 
the court calendar, lists with offices and their allocation were made known to the 
public, an occasion preceded by a whirlwind of appeals and interventions, during 
which court servants could market their services. Intercession of persons at court 
could work wonders for lesser offices, and might even reach to higher levels. 
Repeatedly European court ordinances forbade servants, particularly chamber 
servants, to accept and forward requests to the ruler – surely a practice that must 
have been lucrative as well as frequent. Did their compeers at Asian courts seek 
similar opportunities?  
 
Through all these mechanisms the dynastic centre could function as the hub in 
a wheel involving many regions and groups. This centrality could never be taken 
for granted in the long run. The court could be perceived as being unduly biased in 
its system of rewards and punishments, or as too withdrawn to fulfill its ritual 
functions. Its ideal image could easily be turned into its opposite – a situation 
neatly fitting the expectation of cyclical renewal of the dynasty. The dynastic cycle, 
or Ibn Khaldun‘s parallel view of inevitable erosion of tribal purity and force, can 
be interpreted in a less moral way. Innovative institutions and loyal groups devised 
by a new dynasty could through their very success become obstacles for 
successors. The devshirme-recruited slave infantry crack troops of the Sultan, the 
janissaries, epitomize this metamorphosis. Starting out as the Sultan‘s most trusted 
servants, they gradually consolidated their one-generation position through 
marriage, succession, and close connections with Istanbul‘s trades and crafts. They 
became the archetypical kingmakers and praetorians, protecting the dynasty while 
incidentally threatening or deposing the incumbent. In 1826 Sultan Mahmud II 
violently disbanded the corps, which acted as a strong interest group and a brake on 
reforms.  
 
The figure in the centre, surrounded by inner court servants with their own 
agendas, could be manipulated in many ways. Withholding and modifying 
information are a side effect of autocratic rulership itself: who brings the emperor 
the bad news?
55
 Spanish monarchy was the marvel of sixteenth-century Europe, but 
through financial problems and privatization it lost this role in two generations. 
France repeated the same pattern a century later, when the entrenched elites created 
by monarchy declined to sacrifice their privileged role and obstructed government. 
These diminutive dynastic cycles, obscured by rapid development from the later 
eighteenth century onwards, conform roughly to patterns we can observe in other 
pre-modern states and empires. 
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 See the communication between official and emperor as sketched in Pierre-Henri 
DURAND, ‗Langage burocratique et histoire. Variations autour du Grand Conseil et de 
l‘ambassade Macartney‘, Études Chinoises, 13, 1 (1993) pp.  41-145.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
The preceding outline of themes recurring in the history of the dynastic centre, 
provides a framework for several thematically delineated research projects. These, 
in turn, will give more force and coherence to the attempt to examine, refute or 
substantiate the preliminary statements made here in a comprehensive synthesis. 
This joint venture can also help to clarify and translate the terminology of the 
dynastic centre, producing a glossary of concepts, activities, ranks, and offices. 
Through the analysis of the domestic heart of the pre-modern state it aims to 
reassess the classic divisions between models of power in East and West. 
Undoubtedly, major differences exist, but they deserve to be considered afresh, 
without the biases created by European modernization.  
 
It will be necessary to differentiate carefully between ideologies and practices. 
In early modern Europe elites tended to present themselves in terms of lineage and 
nobility, even when this was far from plausible; in the Asian context, the slave 
status of the Sultan‘s elite servants complicated the discourse of lineage, but did 
not preclude the formation of hereditary power elites. In China, likewise, the civil 
service examinations stressed merit rather than descent, and could not guarantee 
individual succession to high office. Yet the system did not prevent gentry lineages 
to maintain comfortable wealth, access to schooling, and hence a group monopoly 
of power positions over the generations. For the rulers themselves, the opposition 
between idealized status and their actually quite vulnerable situation needs to be 
taken into account. How did these rulers, and their political advisers, cope with 
challenges and changes? To what extent did they consciously remodel and use the 
structures of their environment to further their interests? Did their choices mostly 
reflect ad hoc adaptation, or can we understand them as premeditated 
interventions? If the latter appears to be true, did the consequences of these actions 
match the intentions, in the short run and in the longer term?  
 
Finally, the study of pre-modern polities based on household structures 
touches many aspects that seem strikingly familiar in the modern political context. 
Notwithstanding sweeping changes in political legitimacy and political processes, 
coercion, ideology and interests still form the main components forming attitudes 
of acquiescence or resistance. States still have a ritual heart where show and 
ceremony are often as important as the actual content of discussion. Distribution of 
honours occupies pride of place in modern as well as pre-modern systems, 
although the practice may be veiled more systematically now. Outcries against 
corruption are not new, nor are political scandals. These examples are not intended 
to indicate that change is irrelevant; they do convey the notion that the gap between 
modern and pre-modern polities is as much a rhetorical construction as it is a 
reality. Studying the heart of the pre-modern political system can only help to 
better understand current polities.
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 The anonymous reader of this journal pointed out to me that this position reflects 
Susanne RUDOLPH, Lloyd RUDOLPH, The Modernity of Tradition: Political 
Development in India (Chicago 1967).  
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